The dock's provider row opens a list of providers, and the model picker opens on the provider in use, with tab to widen it; signing in opens it on the provider just signed in to. Models go by their id unless config names them, and the model row wears its maker's mark. The guided review's guide prompt is shorter, the pull request brief shows the start of the description with the rest behind p, its commits drop the Luxe-review and Luxe-revision lines, and the weakened-gates signal is gone. luxe update reruns the installer it was installed with, in place of luxe-cli-update. The preview's FILE tab reads files the session changed outside the project, and only those. Smaller fixes: bash headers are highlighted, the preview loses a blank row, the launcher divider sits inside its frame, and the phone app's top bar is clear of iOS's blur. rustls-webpki 0.103.16 and webpki-roots 1.0.10 fix RUSTSEC-2026-0381 and RUSTSEC-2026-0382, and vite 8.3.4 fixes GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm, GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv and GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw.
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title, summary, order, group
| title | summary | order | group |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security and permissions | What the agent may do, the rules and prompts that decide it, secrets, and what luxe sends over the network. | 1 | Reference |
The agent reads and writes files and runs commands on your machine. luxe lets ordinary work through without asking, keeps a few guardrails on at all times, and gives you rules to tighten the rest. For real isolation, run it in a container.
What is allowed by default
Every tool call is allowed, asked about, or denied. With no configuration:
| Denied | Reading .env and .env.* files (.env.example is fine). Catastrophic commands: wiping /, your home folder or a system folder, mkfs, dd to a device, fork bombs. Running a command as root; see below. The same call with the same arguments a third time in a row: the agent is told it already has the result. |
| Asked | Anything outside the project folder. git push --force. Committing. Writes to GitHub: opening, merging or commenting on pull requests and issues, and re-running CI. Capturing your screen. |
| Allowed | Everything else |
Commands are matched piece by piece, so cd /tmp && rm -rf / is caught. These are guardrails, not
a security boundary: a model set on getting around a pattern can. Committing asks because a commit
moves what Guided Review compares against; answer Allow always once and it stops asking.
Recursive rm has its own check, covering -r, -R, combined flags, --recursive and an
end-of-options --. It catches /, /*, whole-home targets such as ~, $HOME and ${HOME},
and protected system folders and their contents. Ordinary build-folder cleanup stays allowed.
/etc-backup/ isn't /etc, so its name alone doesn't trigger this guard.
A Bash allowance or session approval cannot waive this check; --yolo disables the default guard.
Permission modes
luxe --permission-mode strict
| Mode | |
|---|---|
default |
The defaults above |
strict |
Ask before every change: write, edit, bash, git, debug, a test with its own command, and an applied ast_grep or lsp_navigation change |
read-only |
Deny every change, and a test with its own command. Reading, search, code intelligence and detected tests still work. Also --read-only. |
yolo |
Allow everything, guardrails off. Also --yolo. Your own deny rules still apply. |
Plan mode is a different thing: the session's mode, not a permission mode. It refuses every change but a write to the plan file, before the permission rules are asked, so a rule that allows a command does not let plan mode run it. A review runs in a mode that refuses every change.
Rules
{
"mode": "default",
"permission": {
"bash": { "*": "allow", "rm *": "ask", "git push * --force *": "deny" },
"git": { "commit*": "allow" },
"read": { "*": "allow", "*.env": "deny", "*.env.example": "allow" },
"external_directory": { "~/scratch/**": "allow" },
"mcp": { "github/*": "ask" }
}
}
- Keys are tool names (
bash,read,edit, which also coverswrite,glob,grep,git,webfetch,websearch,screenshot,mcp), plusexternal_directoryfor paths outside the project,doom_loopfor repeated calls, andhook_askfor hooks that ask. - Values are
allow,askordeny, or a map from pattern to one of them. - Patterns:
*matches anything,?one character, and~your home folder.git *also matchesgitalone. Abashpattern matches the command; areadoreditpattern, the path; anmcppattern,server/tool. - The most specific pattern wins.
Bash chains are also checked segment by segment. An allowance for git * does not allow
git status && curl example.com: the curl segment needs its own allowance. A denied segment
blocks the call. Otherwise, if any segment asks, the call asks too. Every segment must be allowed
for the whole chain to run without asking. The matcher is best-effort, not a shell parser.
Tools that run a program, change files or search a folder are judged by the same rules:
| Tool | Also checked as |
|---|---|
test with a command |
bash, segment by segment, with its filter; a filter that hides a second command is checked too |
debug launch |
bash, as the program and its arguments; a shell's -c script is checked as a command of its own |
ast_grep replace with apply: true |
edit, for each path |
lsp_navigation rename or code action with apply: true |
edit, for the file |
grep, glob, ast_grep |
read, for the folder or file searched |
module_report, read_symbol, lsp_navigation, lsp_diagnostics |
read, for each file opened |
Each tool's own rules still apply alongside. A folder outside the project asks, and a named .env
is denied even with all: true. Always on these prompts remembers only what was asked: the
exact command for test and debug, the folder for one search outside the project, and nothing
for an applied change, since its files aren't known until it runs.
grep and ast_grep also check every file they find before reading it, so a search of the whole
project skips a nested .env; glob checks every name before listing it. A file your rules deny is
skipped. One that would ask is read when the run approves asks on its own (headless by default, or
with auto-approve on) and skipped otherwise, since a search can't stop to ask. The result says how
many were skipped; read the file to be asked. A walk over a huge tree stops at 100,000 files and
says so.
An applied rename or code action is refused whole if the language server's edit names a file outside the project or inside a fetched repository. These checks cover what a tool is asked to open. They don't sandbox a language server, which can index other files and runs the project's own code.
A project's .luxe/permissions.json can only make your rules stricter, never looser, unless you
start luxe with --trust-project.
The permission prompt
When a call needs approval, a prompt opens above the composer:
| Choice | Does |
|---|---|
| Allow once | Run this call |
| Allow for this session | Allow calls like it until you quit |
| Allow always | Write the rule to your ~/.config/luxe/permissions.json |
| Reject | Refuse; the agent is told and carries on |
The prompt shows the rule an Allow always would write: a command family, such as cargo *, or
the whole folder for a path outside the project. A hook's prompt or a chained Bash command offers
only Allow once and Reject: one command family cannot cover a chain. Choose with the
arrows and enter, or a number; esc rejects. For a moment after it opens, the prompt ignores
every key but esc, so typing meant for the composer cannot answer it.
When you step away
Auto-approve (/permissions on, or --auto-approve) allows every call that would ask, while
your deny rules still hold. The statusline says auto-approve for as long as it is on.
A run with nobody to answer, such as --headless, luxe loop or a phase reviewer, allows
every ask by default. To refuse them instead, and tell the agent why:
luxe --headless --on-ask deny -p "…"
or "agent": { "on_ask": "deny" } in config.json. A project can set deny but not allow.
Four GitHub actions need a person: merging a pull request, closing one, submitting a review, and
closing an issue. Auto-approve and unattended runs refuse them. To let an unattended run do one,
allow it in your own rules, such as "bash": { "gh pr merge *": "allow" }.
Joining a session
A session open in the interface can be joined by another program, which then sees the conversation and can answer its prompts. That makes who may join a security question:
- Only your user account. The socket sits in a folder only you can open, only you can use it, and luxe checks the account of whatever connects. On Windows the named pipe admits your account alone, and refuses remote clients. Nothing listens on the network.
- Not the agent. A program the agent started, at any depth, is turned away, so it can't
approve its own prompts. luxe checks the joining process's ancestry. It can't see past a program
that detaches from its parent, such as one started with
setsidand left running after its parent exits, so treat this as a tripwire, not a wall. A command that would do that should be something your rules ask about. - A guest can't do everything. A joined client can't switch or end the session, and can't publish to GitHub.
Anything running as you can already read your sessions on disk and your credentials, so joining
adds a way to steer, not a way to read. To turn it off, set
joinable to false.
luxe remote
luxe remote is the one part of luxe that answers network requests, and it is off
until you run it. It puts your sessions in reach of your phone, so it takes two things to get in:
- Your Tailscale login. The bridge listens on this machine only (
127.0.0.1) and refuses to listen anywhere else. Tailscale Serve carries it to your tailnet over HTTPS and adds the login of whoever is asking, replacing any the request brought. A request without one didn't come through Serve and is refused, and so is a login other than yours or one you--allow. luxe never uses Tailscale Funnel, which would publish it to the internet. - A paired device. Any program on this machine can reach a local port and claim a login, so
every session also needs the credential a device gets when it pairs. An invitation works once,
within ten minutes. luxe keeps only a hash of each invitation and credential, in
~/.config/luxe/remote.json. The device keeps its credential in a cookie scripts can't read, sent only over HTTPS and never with a request from another site; a request a page on another site makes is refused too.
Revoking a device disconnects it within a few seconds. A device joins a session as a guest, with the same limits as any joined client, and the interface names it when it joins and when it answers a prompt. The name is the device's own label: whether a client may answer prompts at all is still decided by the process checks above.
Notifications are off until you turn them on in the app, one device at a time, and they never
answer anything: a notification says what is waiting and where, such as "Approve bash" over the
folder's name, never the command, and answering takes the app. While any device has them on, the
bridge joins each running session to watch for prompts. It joins watch-only: the terminal doesn't
announce it, and luxe drops anything it sends, so a client nobody sees can't act. Each
notification is sealed so only that device can read it (RFC 8291) and posted to the push service
the device's browser picked; the push service sees when, not what. The bridge posts only to
Apple's, Google's, Mozilla's and Microsoft's push services, so a paired device can't aim it at
anything else on your network. It signs with a key of its own, kept in remote.json, and revoking
a device ends its notifications.
The bridge starts luxe only in a folder a device asks for, as you, in a herdr pane when herdr is
already running and as its own luxe --rpc otherwise. A packager can build luxe without the
remote feature, which leaves out the bridge entirely.
A session is open in one luxe at a time. A second luxe --resume of a session the interface
already has, or a resume from the session list, is refused and says which process has it. The lock
is the operating system's, so a crash never leaves a session stuck.
Secrets
- Credentials are stored in
~/.config/luxe/auth.json, readable only by you. luxe warns ifauth.jsonormodels.jsoncan be read by others. - A key is found in this order:
--api-keyorLUXE_API_KEY, then what you signed in with, then the provider's own variable, then a provider block inauth.jsonormodels.json. For a provider luxe does not know, the block comes beforeOPENAI_API_KEY. The order is the same for the provider a session starts on and for one you switch to in/model. - A key can be
$VARor!commandrather than the value, so it never sits in a file. A command runs when a key is needed, so treat these files like your shell's startup file. It runs from your home folder and is stopped after 30 seconds, so a password manager that asks for a passphrase needs a graphical prompt. - Anything that looks like a secret (API keys, tokens, private keys, passwords in URLs) is removed
from tool output before the model, the transcript, hooks or the log see it. So is every key and
token luxe itself has used or loaded, whatever it looks like, including
$VARand!commandkeys and MCP tokens, as long as it is at least 8 characters. - MCP sign-in tokens are kept in
~/.local/state/luxe/mcp-auth.json, outside your config folder, so a dotfiles repository never carries them. - An MCP server's
authtoken or OAuth sign-in only travels overhttps, or plainhttpto this machine; a server or sign-in endpoint elsewhere on plainhttpis refused. A key you put in a server'sheadersis not checked, so usehttpsfor one. See MCP. - Anthropic and Google take API keys only, since their terms do not allow their subscriptions in other programs.
Commands that need root
The agent does not run commands as root: sudo, doas, su, pkexec, run0, and gsudo or
runas on Windows. A command that needs root needs your attention and consent, and typing it into
your own terminal is how you give both. So when a step needs one, the agent puts the exact command
in a code block, you copy it into another terminal and run it, then tell the agent it is done.
The same goes for a command that waits on you at a terminal, such as a password, a confirmation or
an interactive installer. Commands the agent runs have no terminal and nothing to read from, so one
of those fails or carries on with empty input, rather than waiting where nobody can answer. Most,
such as sudo, say what they wanted; a shell's read just gets an empty answer.
To allow it anyway, decide ahead of time in your global file. It only helps where no password is
needed, such as a passwordless sudo rule for one program:
{ "permission": { "bash": { "sudo pacman *": "allow" } } }
--yolo allows it too. A project's .luxe/permissions.json cannot.
Screen capture
The screenshot tool's url mode renders a web page and captures only that. Its fullscreen,
region and window modes capture whatever is on your screen, and the image goes to your model
provider, so each asks first, and runs with nobody watching refuse them. To turn screen capture
off entirely:
{ "permission": { "screenshot": { "fullscreen": "deny", "region": "deny", "window": "deny" } } }
Untrusted repositories
Opening a repository should not run its code. So, without --trust-project:
- Its
.luxe/hooks.jsonis ignored. - Its
gate.commandsin.luxe/config.jsonare ignored with a warning. The loop uses your global commands instead; a project list needs--trust-project. - Its
.luxe/permissions.jsoncan only tighten your rules. - Its MCP servers, language servers and formatters start only in an interactive session; see Tools.
Its AGENTS.md and skills, including the ones it commits in .agents/skills/, still reach the
model, because your own project's are the point of the feature. luxe removes text a reviewer
cannot see, comments and invisible Unicode, and leaves out a file it cannot finish checking; see
What luxe removes. Plain text is still instructions, so read
an unfamiliar repository's AGENTS.md as you would its Makefile.
Text from GitHub, such as issues and comments, is filtered the same way and given to the agent as
someone else's words, not as instructions. So are MCP servers' descriptions and results.
A language server can run project code itself: rust-analyzer runs build.rs. Treat opening a
repository in luxe like building it.
A repository the agent fetches with web_fetch is different: you never chose to open it. luxe
clones it into .luxe/gh-cache/ with symbolic links flattened to plain files, and starts no
language server or formatter there; see Tools.
Isolation
Rules are a policy, not a sandbox. For hard isolation, run luxe in a container that mounts only the project:
docker run --rm -it -v "$PWD":/work -w /work -e ANTHROPIC_API_KEY <image-with-luxe> \
luxe --headless -p "…"
Do not mount your home folder or SSH keys. --network none works for everything but the model
provider, the web tools, the catalog refresh and the update check.
What luxe sends over the network
There is no telemetry. luxe connects only to:
- The model provider you configured, including the cache refreshes described in
Keeping the cache warm (
"agent": { "cache_warming": "off" }stops them). For GitHub Copilot that includes reading your plan's usage from GitHub every few minutes while you work (LUXE_COPILOT_PLAN_USAGE=0stops it). For an Azure resource it includes listing what the resource has deployed when you open/model("discover_deployments": falseon the provider stops it) - Search providers and web pages, when the agent uses
web_searchorweb_fetch, and GitHub whenweb_fetchclones a repository ("tools": { "clone_repositories": false }stops it) - The models.dev catalog, to refresh model details (
LUXE_MODELS_DEV_REFRESH=0stops it) - The update check, once a day (
"update": { "check": false }stops it), and when you runluxe updateor/update, which then runs your package manager's own update, or for the install script, downloads the new release's script from GitHub and runs it - GitHub, through your own
gh, when you, the agent or an RPC client work with pull requests and issues. A client can write there only if you start it with--github-writes. - Your device's push service (Apple's, for an iPhone), when you turn on notifications in the
luxe remoteapp, sealed so only that device can read them (turning them off in the app stops it)
None of them carries anything about you or your machine. The update check sends no version, platform or identifier; it downloads a public file and compares versions locally.
One local report stays on your machine: inside a herdr pane, luxe runs
herdr's own command to tell it whether the agent is working, idle or waiting on you, and the id of
the session for herdr to resume. Nothing is sent outside herdr, and "herdr": false stops it.
And a running session takes connections on a local socket only you can open, so another program can
join it; "joinable": false stops that.
Apart from notifications, luxe remote sends nothing of its own. It answers your paired devices
through Tailscale Serve and runs your own tailscale and herdr commands; see
luxe remote.
What you post to GitHub is yours alone: reviews, replies and pull requests are posted from a preview, with nothing added, and no agent tool can post them.
Supply chain
luxe is written in Rust with unsafe code denied throughout, apart from a few small, reviewed
modules that call the operating system directly. One starts each command in a session of its own,
so nothing the agent runs can reach your terminal. On Windows, one keeps the programs luxe starts
off the stdin --rpc reads, one ends a command's whole process tree on a timeout, and one locks
the session pipe to your account. CI checks
every dependency's security advisories and license with cargo-deny, builds with --locked, and
pins its GitHub Actions to exact commits.